TENSIONS BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DOMESTIC
RESPONSIBILITIES.
Professor Maxwell Chibundu1
You’ll notice that I have modified the title of my talk from one about
“conflict” between “international law” and “domestic responsibilities,” to a
presentation on “tensions” among the two. That is because while conflicts may or
may not be reconcilable, tensions almost always are.
But in exchange for this softening of the title, let me begin with a
provocative statement. There is no objective or absolute truth out there. That’s
not the same as saying there are no truths. Far from it, truths and falsities are in
fact contextual, and the most overwhelming context is that grounded in
experience. So let me give you a bit of background, which I think is important in
evaluating what I have to say; in your giving or withholding credence from the
views that I shall be expressing.
I was born in Nigeria, just about the time that the majority of African
countries were becoming independent self-ruling members of the international
society. Independence and decolonization, I think, were primarily the products of
Africans. However, they would have been impossible without the particular
climate present throughout the world at that time. The climate was one in which
international law gave a lot of credence to and actually bought into the notion of
self-determination. So it would not have been possible to have the transference of
political power if the international legal climate was not conducive to it.
On the other hand it is equally true that Africa’s independence contributed
quite a good deal to international law’s understanding and formation of the
concept of self-determination. In particular, the idea was transposed from its
Central and East European setting of the first half of the twentieth century that
involved claims of nationhood by ethnic minorities within territorially contiguous
empires to claims for political independence by trans-oceanic colonially
administered societies. While the two groups may have shared the desire for
freedom from subjugation, it is the colonial setting with its subtext of racially
tinged deprivation of human rights – economic and socio-cultural, as well as
political – that came to dominate the international perspective of the struggle for
self-determination. I shall return to this point at the back end of this talk.
I. THE CROSSROADS OF INTERACTION
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Tensions Between International Law and Domestic Responsibilities
The central point I want to make about the relationship of international
law and domestic responsibilities, then, is that the relationship is best seen as an
interactive process: that is, Africans are participants in the making of international
law and international law influences their domestic politics and economies.
Between 1960 and roughly 1975, Africa and Africans stood tall on the world
stage. Part of what made that possible was simply that economic conditions
allowed them to do precisely that. Aside from the hope and optimism that is
inbred in youth, the price of raw materials, Africa’s primary resource, other than
its people, was very much on the increase. Africans joined other raw material
producers, notably South Americans, in getting the international system to focus
on issues related to the national sovereignty of peoples over the extraction of raw
materials found in their territories. I arrived in the United States at the height
(and, in retrospect, simultaneously end) of that age of Africa’s decolonization and
economic nationalism; that is, in the second-half of the 1970s. And I became very
much an observer from outside, with more or less the relative dispassion of an
insider-turned-outsider.
The history of the late 1970s through roughly 2000 was the reverse of
what had happened from 1955 to 1975. The dominant discourses in international
law were moved away from foundational issues of political independence, selfdetermination, or the sovereignty of states and peoples over their natural
resources, to focus on microcosmic questions of structural adjustment programs,
debt crisis, poverty, famine, and the like. The optimistic possibilities of the 1960s
gave way to the pessimism of the 1980s. Post-1975 Africa was primarily about
the absence of resources not their abundance. This could not help but shape
attitudes about Africa’s role in the international legal order and hence views of its
contribution to that order.
The period from 1980-1990 is commonly called the “Lost Decade.” It
was not only lost to Africa but also to Latin America. This was a decade
dominated by an international debt crisis, in which African societies either
suffered benign neglect within the international capital system, or as wards of that
system had dictated to them the implementation of certain structural adjustment
policies that made evident their very limited capacity to fend for themselves.
I started teaching international law in 1989, a year that coincided with the
coming to heads of the pressures that had been building up, and which
foreshadowed the next decade of development in Africa. That year, the World
Bank published a report that synthesized the paucity of good news on Africa.2
The Report was a follow up to another that had ushered in the decade, and which
presciently predicted much of the loss that the continent sustained.3 The
Economist, reporting on the World Bank 1989 Report, noted, as did other outlets
and books, that the entire continent of Africa with about 600 million people had
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Tensions Between International Law and Domestic Responsibilities
about the same output as the tiny country of Belgium with about 10 million
people.4
It was about the same time that the term “Washington Consensus” was
coined, and although formulated in the context of Latin America, the standard
belief was that the neoliberal economic prescriptions of the Washington
Consensus were just as relevant to Africa as to Latin America. The Washington
Consensus received a fair amount of disapproving remarks but actually the guy
who coined that term was offering a cure for the malaise of the 1980s in the
context of Latin America.
In the context of Africa no one knew what to do about its ailments. Books
on Africa during this period were filled with pessimism about the future of the
African state as a political unit, and its indisputable failure as an economic and
administrative entity; pessimism often unmistakably conveyed in their titles.5
Today, there’s a good deal less pessimism. About two months ago I read a
book titled “Africa’s Turn?”6 It is edited primarily by the economist Edward
Miguel. His basic thesis is that there might be in Africa, during the early decades
of the 21st century, the sort of sweeping economic transformation (a “miracle”)
that is typically associated with the rapid development of the East Asian
economies in the last quarter of the twentieth century. I’m an agnostic about
miracles, whether of the religious or secular kind; so I take no position on their
likelihood. But it does seem that Africa may once more be on the cusp of
significant economic mobilization. Similarly the current director of the IMF, in
his blogging while travelling through Africa, recently has had a remarkably
optimistic take on the continent’s current prospects. 7
What does all that have to do with the tensions between international Law
and domestic responsibilities? Well part of it – the core point I want to make – is
that there is no such thing as a static view of the relationship between Africa and
the rest of the world. It has changed over time. And we should expect continuing
change. One of the purposes of this presentation is to provide some basic (if you
prefer, ‘raw’) material for anticipating and evaluating that dynamism.
But one last side trip that I hope nonetheless provides useful context for
what I shall be saying shortly. At about the same time that I received the
invitation to this conference, a student posed a puzzling question to me: “Why
don’t you believe in the possibilities of Africa’s success?” Taken aback, I
inquired into the basis for the question. The student drew my attention to a
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recently published review of a book to which I had been a contributor.8 An
objective of the volume as seen by the editor was an exploration of Africa’s
contributions to international law. In the framework of the reviewer, this
apparently implied that Africa’s involvement in the international legal order had
to be either that of “an object” or that of “a maker” of international law. As is
evident from what I’ve said thus far, and what I shall develop further in this talk,
it is the sort of rigid and ossified dichotomy that I hope you will reject. Which, I
suppose, is why I prefer to think of the tensions that indisputably arise in the
balancing of the obligations of international law and those of domestic
governance in terms of their fluidity rather than as hard cast or a zero sum
relationship. Now, let me turn to those tensions.
II. DECOLONIZATION AND THE TRADE-OFFS OF GLOBAL ACTIVITY
The standard regime of decolonization in Africa entailed gift-wrapping
political independence as a packaged good. Immediately on (indeed concurrently
with) gaining independence, African states sought and received memberships in
international organizations, notably the United Nations system. Indeed, we are
this year “celebrating” the half-century mark of the year declared by the United
Nations to be Africa’s. In short, taking up membership in international
organizations and thereby assuming the obligations of international law was a
reflexive act with hardly any consideration of calculating and weighing the cost of
the investment and its return.
Yet there are at least three sets of tradeoffs involved in those transactions,
each meriting different criteria with which to gauge their optimality – at least in
terms of the topic of this talk. The first identifiable source of possible tensions
between international law obligations and domestic responsibilities would be in
the balancing of resource allocation or distribution among these arenas. The most
obvious case is the financial costs of the one and the foregone consumption in the
other. At the moment, this is a particularly poignant point as South Africa’s hosts
the world Cup; but it has always been an ever-present issue as African countries
reflexively sought-out or accepted memberships in international organizations.
Being a member of an international organization requires the expenditure of
scarce and frequently rationed hard currency to maintain expensive diplomatic
missions and ambassadorships while farmers do without fertilizers. Are the
returns worth the tradeoff? The cost-benefit analysis becomes more complicated
as African states are required to assume more and more the costs and
responsibilities of the interventionist international system that has emerged over
the last two decades.
“Peace keeping,” “peace enforcement,” “humanitarian intervention” and
“responsibility to protect” have all become part of the vocabulary of international
law. A fairly recent example of that is Rwanda who now must fund a
peacekeeping group. Other African countries must do the same thing.
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It is easy enough to argue that these expenditures can be subsidized by the
international system, but rarely do subsidies ever make the recipient whole. And
in any event, there are always the opportunity costs of diverting the talents of
young persons from domestic national construction to intervention abroad,
however meritoriously humanitarian the latter is said to be. And then, there is the
rich history of Africa’s military coup d’état leaders having been outstanding
students of military officer training schools of Europe and the United States,
presumably one of the forms of foreign assistance in our age of humanitarian
intervention. How do we balance these tradeoffs, then, and are the costs worth
the benefits?
A second set of tradeoffs is what one might call functional tradeoffs. An
example is that recently the chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court
obtained warrants for the arrest of the President of Sudan. Many African member
countries of the Court, in clear contravention of their undertakings under the
Rome Treaty and the United Nations Charter, have explicitly declined to enforce
the warrant. Those countries that have not explicitly taken a position (as indeed
may be the case with the countries that have) clearly are in a bind. The discharge
of their international legal obligations will have to be at the cost of disrupting the
tenuous and fragile internal harmony that may exist among the country’s plural
religious, linguistic and ethnic population groups, and of course that hallmark of
African identity, solidarity with other peoples of the continent. For legal
formalists, human rights proponents, and indeed the vast majority of those who
live outside the continent, the bind may appear artificial, but those who live on the
continent will beg to differ.
The conflict in Darfur poses for many here no moral or political
ambiguities; however, for many in Africa, it is as much a conflict about the
distribution of limited resources and issues of political determination as it is about
human rights and “genocides.” But what is true about the place of an
international criminal proceeding in the regulation of an internal political conflict
is equally true in a host of other arenas in which an appeal to international law
may be seen as intended to undermine the quite fragile internal institutional
structures of governance within African countries.
And the issue here is not wholly systemic but raises questions of group
affinities and personal identifications. Does one’s membership in the African
community transcend whatever commitments are implied by a country’s
accession to the International Criminal Court? Can the particularities or
exigencies of the moment vitiate the obligation to follow an abstract principle, or
comply with a legal commitment reflexively entered into? I cannot say that there
are straightforward or easy answers to such questions.
The third set of tensions are, by my way of thinking, the most
fundamental. These tensions (and perhaps here ‘conflict’ may not be too strong a
term) go to the issue of when in resolving domestic legal conflicts, a domestic
court must adopt international legal norms, regardless of local preferences or
practices. Unlike the first two which raise essentially practical (even if admittedly
difficult) problems of quantification and national identity, this third set of tensions
exist as much in the realm of the conceptual as of the practical. What makes these
5
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tensions particularly problematic, however, is that they are inherent in any organic
process of nation-building. Because of their importance to that process, and
because the tradeoffs are not quite as transparently obvious as those already
considered, it is worth taking a step back to engage in a didactic primer of a basic
jurisprudential topic in international law discourse.
III. MONISM V. DUALISM: THE PERPETUAL DEBATE
A well known disagreement among international lawyers revolves around
the extent to which international law stands at the apex of law or whether
international law is itself subject to domestic laws. One of the advantages that
students of international law in the United States may have is that such a debate is
not unfamiliar, even within the purely domestic context. In the United States, we
generally think of international law as a distinct legal order that runs parallel (or,
perhaps, perpendicular) to the domestic legal order, and that is subordinate to the
Federal Constitution, and not infrequently, even as subordinate to statutory and
common law. Since the institutions and officers of the United States owe their
primary allegiance to the domestic order, the application of international law in
the United States is commonly viewed as a matter of grace, not one of obligation.
Now, I recognize and admit that I may be oversimplifying matters,
overlooking, for example, such canons of interpretation as the “later in time rule.”
But I think my oversimplification does no harm to the basic points that I want to
make here.
In much of Europe, on the other hand, certainly in their civil law systems,
the tendency is to view the international and domestic legal orders as constituting
a single unit. By subscribing to international law, a society is deemed to have
accepted an obligation to assure the conformity of its domestic legal order to the
demands of the international system. International lawyers use the terms dualism
and monism to convey these distinctive views of the obligation that international
law imposes on domestic legal regimes. Like much else in life, the working out
of the relationship is driven both by a society’s philosophical bent as well as the
demands of practicality. civil law legal orders, based as they are on codified legal
rules, and administered primarily by technocrats, tend to be monists in their
outlook. Those of us who have been trained to see life and the world through the
lens of common law methodologies tend to be skeptical of monism, and prefer to
incorporate international legal rules on the basis of the good (or lack of it) we see
in the rule. Thus, in the United States, we start with a presumption that
international legal rules are not “self-executing,” and can create only those
obligations that the domestic legal order voluntarily assigns to them.
What is overridingly important in these approaches – at least for the
purpose of this talk -- is less the doctrinal differences among them than the fact
that notwithstanding the vigorous debates they engender, the international legal
order itself does not mandate the adoption of one or the other. Under
international law principles, each state is free to adopt either approach, or indeed
to marry the approaches as it sees fit. Yet, there is no denying that in any given
situation, the adoption of one or the other of these approaches gives a direct
6
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signification of the importance the society assigns to international law on the one
hand, and its own history, customs and practices, on the other. And so it is
generally assumed that Europeans, because of their monism, are more favorably
disposed to the place of international law in the organization of their societies
than are dualist Americans. For the same reason, it is also generally assumed that
Europeans are more interested in the development, codification and promotion of
international law and international legal institutions than are those of us who live
on this side of the Atlantic; law students, of course, excepted.
And where do African states stand? One might think that those colonized
or administered by the British may reliably be counted on to approach
international law through the common law dualist lens, and we might expect the
flip side from the Francophone African states whose modern administrative and
legal structures impeccably were modeled after or descended from the Napoleonic
codes and institutions.
Yet the rhetoric and practices of post-independent African states did not so
readily breakdown along such predictable lines. Indeed, there is little in the
writings of post-independent African jurists that recognize such a divide. Nor is
there any evidence in the practice of the states that suggests that one group of
African states more self-consciously uplift or relegate the place of international
law within their domestic legal orders. These writers, all to a person, uniformly
are unalloyed enthusiastic supporters of international law.
African jurists on international tribunals have been as fervent in
advocating the primacy of international law as those from any other region in the
world. African states have been at the forefront of signing on to international
tribunals even where, as with regard to the International Criminal Court, one may
rationally argue that such advocacy is in fact counter to the personal interests of
the leadership, if not those of the population at large. A cursory glance at the
submission of disputes to international judicial tribunals such as the International
Court of Justice or the Permanent Court of Arbitration reveals that African states
have participated as much as any other region in the world. And, to the extent
that the General Assembly of the United Nations Organization and its various
Committees and Commissions have been movers in the “progressive
development” and codification of international law, African states have been
prime supporters of the movement. These are realities, even if rarely
acknowledged let alone credited by publicists of international law.
What explains this love for international law among Africans? No doubt,
the reflexivity of behavior already alluded to previously in this talk provides a
partial explanation. But it alone does not suffice. I think a more accurate
explanation must include an understanding of the character and nature of the
international legal order into which African states were launched. At the time of
decolonization, international law functioned to equalize differences of power and
resources among states. States were viewed as the primary if not sole concern of
the international legal order and respect for “sovereignty and territorial integrity”
as the anchor of that order appeared to guarantee “basic national dignity” to all
states without regard to national power and influence. It was thus in the selfinterest of African societies to encourage the development of international law.
7
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However, we now inhabit a quite different international environment.
Rather than functioning to promote “national sovereignty” (at least if that means
insulating domestic policies from international scrutiny and criticism),
international law today is at least as much about the protection of the right of
individual and sub-national groups to assert claims under its auspices against
national governments. This has invigorated arguments for piercing the shield of
sovereignty. And it is of course this new movement in international law that most
significantly and substantially fronts the topic of this talk. The scope of the
problem and the future of its resolution are probably foreshadowed by the
approach and decisions of the South African Constitutional Court.
The South African constitution purports to make international law at least
as relevant as (if not superior to) purely domestic law in the lives of ordinary
South Africans. To this end, the obligations of the South African Government
and South African society in fostering “equality,” “liberty” and “human rights”
are to be measured by international law standards. Domestic law deemed to be
inconsistent with the asserted international legal norms is thus viewed with
hostility. And so, cultural practices and traditions such as those that tolerate
“polygamy” and the “patriarchal” conveyance of property (to take two well
known examples) are not validated merely by pedigree or longevity, but must be
subjected to scrutiny under international law standards, and if wanting, must be
abandoned. The apparent underlying logic is that we now live in a
“cosmopolitan” age that, like the previously totemic concept of “modernity,”
provides the gold standard for valuing the legitimacy of legal orders.
This approach contrasts substantially with the attitude espoused in the
United States Constitution and her legal order. The US Constitution states that it
and the laws and treaties “made under” it are the supreme law of the land.9 The
plain language of the Constitution therefore creates a hierarchy of legal rules in
which the statutory laws and treaties are subject to control by the Constitution.
Treaties, of course, provide the primary articulation of international law. The US
Constitution is however silent on the other main source of international law,
customary international law, and this has led to interesting debates among US
academics as to the place of customary international law within the US
constitutional order.
One need not take a position, however, on this debate for not even the
most vigorous proponent of controlling role for international law in the US legal
order argues that it is on the same level as, let alone that of superseding, the
Constitution. United States jurists thus argue over whether a statute should trump
a treaty and vice versa, but not whether the Constitution controls US international
law obligations. It is summarily accepted that any international law norm found
to be inconsistent with the U.S. constitutional legal order is thereby invalid as law
within the United States. International lawyers (at least those with a monist
perspective) of course find this arrangement unsatisfying, but its legitimacy is
nowhere questioned, even within the foundational doctrines of international law
itself. But what is accepted as valid in the case of the United States does not
necessarily command the same status of legitimacy when applied in discourse
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about African societies. International humanitarians need not accept from these
beneficiaries of international aid what they grudgingly accept as valid practices by
a self-sufficient superpower.
There are then at least two distinctive tradeoffs for African states in the
monism-dualism conceptualization of the relationship of the domestic legal order
to international law. The dualist methodology is by far a good deal more
developed – at least for common law oriented African states -- and offers the
possibilities of the internal development of cultural traditions and practices. It
runs the risk, however, of drawing hostile intellectual criticism from those with
resources to fund not only the legal order, but much else that goes by the name of
“development.” Monism on the other hand would be welcomed by this latter
group, but the legal order that would emerge might well be alienating for the
indigenous populations of the continent. But then, isn’t that the history of
colonization? And so, the struggle for self-identification and self-determination
continues.
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